
would have the needed planes available much sooner. Not only could this sa ve about $20 billion, but the U.S.

Better use, moreover should be made of the existing fleet of 2-130 and C-141B Starlifterll strategic.aircraft. As such, the Air Force should cancel the C-17, now in a proposed planes as the Lockheed C-5B, which could be produced s ooner i Ifull-scale engineering-phase of development, and instead, build more C-5B cargo and KC-10 cargo tanker aircraft.

airlift needs and of the C-17 program reveals that a new cargo plane is not needed to close the gap. By designating a new generation of cargo airplane.the McDonnell Douglas C-17, as the Plan ' s centerpiece, the Pentagon may be making a serious and costly error The Air Force Plan suffers from two fundamental flaws: 1) it underutilizes aircraft already in the airlift fleet as well as such and at a significantly lower acquisition cost than the C- 17's $180 million each 2) it rests on questionable operational and planning assumptions, such as using the C-17 for both tactical and strategic airlift missions.Ĭareful analysis by experts of U.S. At issue, however, is whether the Air Force's $39.8 billion Airlift Master Plan is the best way to close the gap. needs more airlift capability is widely accepted. This strategic airlift gap is one of the American arsenal's most serious weaknesses. does not have enough cargo planes to speed its forces to distant battlefields. would have to transport six such Army divisions 60 tactical fighter squadrons, and one Marine Amphibious Brigade to Western Europe. 483 C-5 and 1,558 C-141B cargo plane loads to rush the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division-with its 16,800 troops, 290 tanks, 430 armored fighting vehicles, 124 helicopters, 780 combat support vehicle s, 3,580 trucks and other equipment-from its base in Fort Stewart, Georgia, to the trouble spot within the prescribed ten days.

